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There have been developed various methodologies of measuring media concentration. 
The appropriate measure depends on the objective of the measurement which might be on 
the one hand the examination of economic power, or on the other an assessment of 
whether market structure might restrict diversity in the media industry. Frequently media 
academics borrow measures that have been developed by economists. Regarding the 
examination of economic power, economists have used companies' market share, shares 
of assets, value-added, sales, advertising revenue or even number of employees in 
forming an opinion of their bulk in the economy. These measures are more appropriate 
for industrial structure and manufacturing sector. In the media, because of their nature 
and their significant role in culture, society and politics measures examining the media 
firms' economic power alone seem to be inadequate. The special social significance 
attached to the media's role in disseminating information requires an investigation of 
whether a concentrated media market restricts the free flow of information. 
To overcome this limitation of economic-based measures media analysts have 
proposed a number of media concentration measures which take into account their 
importance to the public. The view that was emerged in the 1990s from the debate on 
media concentration at European (initiated by the EU 1992 Green Paper Pluralism and 
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Media Concentration in the Internal Market – CEC, 1992) and national (Arthur 
Andersen's 1994 study UK Media Concentration – Shew, 1994) levels, is that it is 
possible to measure the 'influence' exerted by the media by applying audience-based 
criteria. It has been put forth that while financial units are close to the traditional systems 
of concentration measurement which permit assessment of media market concentration or 
even the existence of a dominant position (concentration of resources), audience-based 
methods are coherent with the cultural/political standpoint and can be held to be most 
effective for the measurement of pluralism and influence in the market-place for ideas. 
Nevertheless, influence over the audience cannot be assessed by using audience-based 
criteria, whether that is readership, audience reach, viewing or listenership share, and so 
on. Audience exposure to mass media is certainly not the same as influence over the 
audience. What end-user methods measure is market power and not ‘influence’ which is 
notoriously hard to establish.  
This article focuses on the non-economic types of concentration measures and 
assesses their appropriateness in the broad context of media concentration's impact on the 
pluralism and diversity. It starts by providing an analysis of the current level of 
concentration of media ownership in the USA and Europe, particularly the UK, and then 
moves on to exploring the methodologies for measuring shares in the political and 
cultural market. The article suggests that assessing shares in the political/cultural markets 
is notoriously difficult and concludes that, given that economic power and pluralism 
(especially in the range of material offered) are closely linked, a combination of 
economic-based and culturally-based units apply.  
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The Level of Media Market Concentration 
 
Concentration of media ownership has been a thorny theme. Undeniably the media have 
become central actors in world businesses; cable TV has increased the number of outlets, 
satellite TV has moved the media into the international arena digitalization is increasingly 
providing the conditions for a global media market. In this context questions are raised 
about the consequences of media concentration on the traditional role of the media in 
democratic societies. The phenomenon of media concentration is certainly not a new one 
- Charles Havas' and Reuters news agencies dominated the international flow of 
information from the second half of the nineteenth century (Tunstall and Palmer, 1991) 
and the phonographic and cinematographic industries have experienced the phenomenon 
of oligopolistic competition from the beginning of the twentieth century. However, 
concentration of control over the media has intensified lately in both the USA and Europe 
due to technology (convergence) and regulation relaxation.  
 
In the USA and Europe, merger and acquisition activity in the information and 
communications industries increased significantly after the deregulatory waves of the 
1980s and intensified during the 1990s (Murdock, 1990; McQuail and Sinue, 1998; 
Iosifidis, 1999). Although the pace of convergence at the level of ownership and control 
differs greatly among countries, vertical and horizontal integration appear to be the two 
most common strategies that communications enterprises follow in order to survive in the 
digital age. Merger and other alliances can be horizontal, that is, between enterprises 
involved in the same sector, or vertical, involving firms operating in different sectors. 
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Vertical integration in the form of joint ownership of both distribution networks and 
audiovisual content has gained momentum in recent decades, with the flagship case being 
the January 2000 US$220 billion merger between the world leading Internet firm AOL 
(America Online) and the audiovisual giant Time Warner.1 The motives of such 
movements are well reported in a number of works (Iosifidis, 1997; McQuail and Sinue, 
1998; Gibbons, 1998; McChesney, 1999; Tambini et al, 2001; Bagdikian, 2004). They 
range from increasing market power and sharing the high cost of digital technologies 
(especially regarding horizontal mergers), to gaining access to know-how, acquiring 
contents, and uncertainty of market demand (the case in vertical mergers).  
 
The common aim of these alliances is to address the opportunities offered by 
technological convergence. However, it is the convergence between the Internet and 
mobile communication alongside the growth of broadband capacity that has prompted the 
development of networks of interactive communication that connect local and global 
spaces. There is clear evidence that corporate media are redirecting their strategies 
toward the Internet (Castells, 2007: 252-4). For example, Rupert Murdoch, owner of the 
global media group News Corporation, said in 2005 that his company had failed properly 
to engage with the online world - and risked losing its position in programming genres 
such as news. Murdoch had no doubt that radical change was coming and that News 
Corporation had to gear up for a wholesale revamp of its approach to the Internet. As a 
result in 2006 News Corporation acquired Intermix Media for approximately $580 
million. The most well-known asset of Intermix Media was MySpace, a social 
networking site, which at the time was the fifth-ranked Web domain in terms of page 
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views. Other examples of alliances involving new media include Google’s 2006 $1.65 
billion acquisition of YouTube, the consumer media company for people to watch and 
share original videos through a Web experience.  
 
But is has been argued that the king of new media is Apple. Despite the global economic 
meltdown, Apple has converted consumers' appetite for convergence into the biggest 
profits in the company's history, selling more than 33 million iPhones since the device's 
introduction in 2007 - 21 million in the 2009 fiscal year alone. In the new-media gold 
rush, it is selling the picks and shovels: its media business model, much like Google's, is 
dedicated to making it easier for users to enjoy other people's content. The iPhone 
represents just the latest advance in Apple's convergence strategy, which dates back to 
the 2001 launch of the iPod music player and 2003 launch of the iTunes music store. 
James McQuivey, an analyst with Forrester Research, says that Apple can ‘deliver all 
kinds of content to you in a way that is so seamless that you cannot pass it up’, thereby 
defying the conventional wisdom that people will not pay for anything they can get 
online free says. McQuivey adds that ‘it's easier to buy media from iTunes than it is to 
steal it’ (see http://www.technologyreview.com/communications/24194).  
 
Vertical Integration was once looked upon with alarm by governments because 
corporations which have control of a total process, from raw material to fabrication to 
advertising and sales, also have few motives for genuine innovation and the power to 
seize out anyone else who tries to compete. This situation distorts the economy with 
monopolistic control over prices. However, governments today have become sympathetic 
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to vertical corporations that have merged into ever larger total systems. This is evidenced 
by the passing of the US Telecommunications Act 1996 and the UK Communications 
Act 2003, which allowed more opportunities for companies to expand across sectors, as 
well as the 2003 EU legal framework for electronic communications, which provided an 
integrative step for convergent companies. As a result, media corporations have remained 




As a result of a liberalizing policy adopted by the US regulatory agency FCC, in 2005 the 
ten largest TV station group owners controlled 300 stations, up from 104 stations in 1995. 
Also group owners can now purchase TV stations with a maximum service area cap of 39 
per cent, up from the previous limit of 35 per cent (it should be reminded that the limit 
was just 25 per cent in 1985). Further, with rules relaxed on cable ownership 90 per cent 
of the top 50 cable companies are owned by the same parent companies that own 
broadcast networks. 
 
Renowned journalist Ben Bagdikian noted in 1983 that in the USA about 50 corporations 
controlled the vast majority of all news media. In his 4th edition, published in 1992, he 
wrote ‘in the U.S., fewer than two dozen of these extraordinary creatures own and 
operate 90% of the mass media’ - controlling almost all of America's newspapers, 
magazines, TV and radio stations, books, records, movies, videos, wire services and 
photo agencies. He predicted then that eventually this number would fall to about half a 
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dozen companies. This was greeted with skepticism at the time. When the 6th edition of 
The Media Monopoly was published in 2000, the number had fallen to six. Since then, 
there have been more mergers and the scope has expanded to include new media like the 
Internet market. In 2004, Bagdikian's revised and expanded book, The New Media 
Monopoly, shows that only five huge corporations -- Time Warner, Disney, News 
Corporation (owned by the Murdoch family), Bertelsmann (a German conglomerate), and 
Viacom (formerly CBS) -- now control most of the media industry in the US. General 










Eli Noam also examined the concentration trend in the US media from 1984 to the mid-
2000s and attempted to establish ‘whether, where, and how American media are 
becoming more (or less) concentrate’ (2009: 4). The scholar analyzed the media, 
information, telecommunications and Internet industries, providing a comprehensive data 
analysis of the market shares in each segment. Like Bagdikian, Noam found that most 
mass media industries experienced gradual, but continuing increases in concentration 
during the two plus decades under review (from 13 per cent controlled by the top five 
firms in 1984 to 26 per cent in 2005). Noam also noted that despite a significant number 
of mergers, mass media concentration remains lower than in the information and 
telecommunications realms, but the gap is closing. Media subsectors that have greater 
electronic and digital emphasis tend to be more concentrated than in those that are less 
dependent on electronic and digital tools. Noam believes concentration is likely to 
continue to increase so that in the future media is likely ‘to be dominated by a few 
relatively focused integrator firms that put together elements provided by numerous 
smaller specialist firms’ (ibid: 6). 
 
However, Noam argued that while mass media industries experienced a continuing 
increase in concentration, overall non-mass media sector concentration followed a ‘U-
shaped path’. In many sectors, concentration declined markedly from 1984 to 1992, 
during the second Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations. During Clinton’s 
presidency (1994–2002), concentration rose again, though not quite to the levels of 1984. 
Between 2001 and 2005 concentration again declined slightly. Nonetheless, only a few 
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sectors are approaching a monopoly situation with more 60 per cent market control by a 
single firm. Noam notes that oligopoly is far more common in non-mass media 
industries. According to Aronson (2010), who wrote a review of Noam’s work, ‘these 
finding may surprise those who presume that Democrats are tougher on big business than 
Republicans’. Another notable finding of Noam’s book is that despite the growing 
convergence, few companies active in one communication sector (mass media, telecom, 
and IT) have moved into other sectors. But most firms from these three sectors have 




In the UK, the companies that are mostly having newspaper interests include: 
 
• News Corporation (owned by the Murdoch family) (The Sun, The Times, The 
Sunday Times, News of the World, 35% of BSkyB). 
 
• Telegraph Media Group (Sir Frederick and Sir David Barclay acquired the 
business in 2004 for £665m) (Daily Telegraph, Sunday Telegraph, weekly 
magazine Spectator, The Scotchman quality daily newspaper, Scotland on Sunday 
quality Sunday title, and the Edinburgh Evening News). 
 
• Daily Mail and General Trust (The Daily Mail, Mail on Sunday, Ireland on 
Sunday, Mail Today – compact size newspaper, Metro – urban national 
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newspaper, Loot – classified directory, London Lite – free sheet. Until January 
2009 the group also owned the dominant paid-for London-area local newspaper 
Evening Standard, which is now sold to Russian billionaire Alexander Lebedev). 
 
• Guardian Media Group (wholly owned by limited company Scott Trust) (The 
Guardian, The Observer, Manchester Evening News - regional newspaper, 
Channel M – regional TV station, numerous regional radio stations across the UK 
under the Real Radio, Smooth Radio and Rock Radio brands, EMAP - a leading 
international business-to-business publishing, events and information company, 
jointly owned with Apax Partners). 
 
• Independent News and Media (O'Reilly family had a controlling interest of over 
29.5% at July 2008, whereas a significant shareholding of over 27% at May 2008 
is owned by Irish entrepreneur, Dennis O’Brien) (The Independent, Independent 
on Sunday. The company also owns the Belfast Telegraph group). 
 
• Northern & Shell Network (owned by Richard Desmond) (Daily Express, Sunday 
Express, Daily Star. It also owns magazines New! and Star). 
 
• Trinity Mirror plc (the result of the takeover of Mirror Group Newspapers by 
Trinity plc in September 1999) (Daily Mirror, Sunday Mirror, The People, Daily 
Record, Sunday Mail – and about 120 regional daily and weekly newspapers). 
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• Pearson plc (The Financial Times, The Economist) 
 
• Gannett UK ltd (extensive local newspaper holdings). 
 
Furthermore, the companies mostly having television interests include: 
 
• ITV plc (previously known as Granada Limited after its former parent Granada 
Television). The name ITV plc followed the merger between Granada and Carlton 
Communications plc. It operates 11 of the 15 regional television broadcasters that 
make up the ITV Network. It owns the national terrestrial analogue television 
channel ITV1 and digital terrestrial television channels ITV2, ITV3 and ITV4. 
 
• British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) (public channel) (2 terrestrial analogue 
television channels BBC1 and BBC2, several digital terrestrial channels including 
BBC3, BBC4, CBBC, Cbeebies, BBC News and BBC Parliament. It has also 
launched the BBC iPlayer - catch-up channel on the last seven days of BBC TV 
and radio. The BBC owns 5 national radio stations and numerous local radio 
stations. It also owns many magazines. 
 
• SVT Group (previously Scottish Media Group) (one ITV licence, SVT, in Central 
and Northern Scotland. In May 2008 it sold Virgin Radioand now concentrates on 
its TV channel. 
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• Channel Four Television Corporation (public body established in 1990, coming 
into operation in 1993) owns Channel 4, a UK public service television 
broadcaster, set up in 1982. Although commercially self-funded, it is ultimately 
publicly owned. It also owns digital terrestrial channels E4 and Film Four. 
 
• Finally, Five (formerly Channel 5) is jointly owned by RTL Group (the result of a 
2000 merger between Bertelsmann, GBL/Electrafina and Pearson) and United 
Business Media (which in 2000 sold its newspaper interests to Northern & Shell 
Network). 
 
It can be seen that the level of media concentration is quite high in the UK. This could be 
attributed to the passing of The Communications Act 2003, which freed up the 
communications industry far more than was expected, removing most of the ownership 
regulations that characterized British broadcasting as it was thought these deprived 
companies of the economies of scale and scope required to expand into foreign markets. 
This provided for the removal of rules preventing 
 
• Joint ownership of television and radio stations. 
 
• Large newspaper groups (for example Murdoch’s News Corporation) from 
acquiring the minor commercial terrestrial broadcaster Five. 
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• Non-European ownership of broadcasting assets, effectively clearing the field 
for take-overs by the world’s corporate media giants. 
 
• Single ownership of the main commercial terrestrial broadcaster ITV, opening 
the way for the creation of a single ITV company, which allowed Carlton and 
Granada to merge and form ITV plc. 
 
European Commission (EC) 
 
An analysis of some past competition decisions in the media sector reveals that the EC 
has become sympathetic to the formation of large European corporations in order to 
enable them to compete globally (Iosifidis, 2005). This can also be viewed as a lever to 
promote market liberalization that would nurture European champions. After all the 
predominantly pro-liberal and pro-competition provisions of the European Treaties 
reflect what Van Guilenburg and McQuail (2003) have dubbed as ‘new paradigm’ of 
media policy prioritizing economic goals over social and political welfare. Meanwhile, in 
the broader context of restructuring of the European audiovisual scene merger cases have 
become more complex and entail increased competition concerns, resembling the 1990s 
merger boom in the USA when the major TV networks were acquired by industrial 
interests. The complexity of mergers in both sides of the Atlantic is a result of a shift in 
the nature of industry concentration, from one based on horizontal mergers to those 
involving vertical integration, as operators sought out alliances which would enable them 





Excessive media concentration can endanger media pluralism (the presence of a number 
of different and independent voices) and diversity in the media (different political 
opinions and representations of culture within the media). Therefore a pluralistic, 
competitive media system is a prerequisite for media diversity. Although pluralism and 
diversity are used interchangeably in this chapter it is worth going through some 
definitions of the concepts to establish why the lack of these ideals in a highly 
concentrated media market might be an issue of public concern. A broad definition of 
media diversity has been provided by Hoffmann-Riem (1987) who referring to the 
broadcasting scene a couple of decades ago distinguished four dimensions of diversity. 
For him there must be diversity of formats and issues, meaning that all the various fields 
and topics - entertainment, information, education and culture - have to be taken into 
account. Secondly, this should be complemented by a diversity or plurality of contents. 
This means that programmes should provide comprehensive and factual coverage of the 
different opinions expressed in a society. Thirdly, person and group diversity must exist. 
Programmes have to cater for the interests of all parts of the community. The main point 
here is access, but also representation. Finally, Hoffmann-Riem pointed out that 
broadcasters should include local, regional, national and supranational content. To sum 




A similar identification of the dimensions of diversity has been provided by McQuail 
(1992: 144-5) who argued that the media can contribute to diversity, firstly by reflecting  
differences in society, secondly by giving access  to different points of view, and thirdly 
by offering a wide range of choice. Diversity as reflection means that pluralistic mass 
media are expected to represent or reflect the prevailing differences of culture, opinion 
and social conditions of the population. Diversity as access refers to the channels through 
which the separate 'voices', groups and interests which make up the society can speak to 
the wider society, and also express and keep alive their own cultural identity. McQuail 
mentioned the most essential conditions for effective access, namely freedom to speak 
out, effective opportunity to speak (a prerequisite is the existence of many and different 
channels) and autonomy or adequate self-control over media access opportunities. 
Finally, diversity as more channels and choice for the audience represents a great deal of 
variety or range of products or services available to consumers, thereby giving them 
greater freedom.  
 
In order to assess diversity in relation to media market structures and media 
concentrations in more particular one also needs to distinguish between external and 
internal diversity. The former, according to McQuail (1992: 145-7) refers to media 
structure because it is related to the idea of access. It relates to the degree of variation 
between separate media sources in a given sector, according to dimensions such as 
politics, religion, social class, and so on. In a given society, there are many separate and 
autonomous media channels, each having a high degree of homogeneity of content, 
expressing a particular point of view, and catering only for its own 'followers'. The latter, 
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McQuail adds, refers to the media content and connects with the idea of representation or 
reflection mentioned above. It relates to the condition where a wide range of social, 
political and cultural values, opinions, information and interests find expression within 
one media organisation, which usually aims at reaching a large and heterogeneous 
audience. A particular channel might be assessed according to the degree of attention 
given to alternative positions on topics such as politics, ethnicity and language and so on. 
  
More recently and with regard to simplifying the complex issue of pluralism and 
diversity and putting the results of the research into operation, the Independent Study on 
Indicators for Media Pluralism in the Member States – Towards a Risk-Based Approach 
(2009)2 split the concept of pluralism into three normative dimensions – political, 
cultural, and demographic pluralism – as well as three operational dimensions – pluralism 
of media ownership/control, pluralism of media types, and genres. It is clearly mentioned 
in the study that the main threat to pluralism of media ownership/control is represented 
by high concentration of ownership with media which can have a direct impact on 
editorial independence, create bottlenecks at distribution level, and further interoperable 
problems. This affects pluralism not only from a supply point of view, but also from a 
distribution and especially an accessibility point of view (p. 75). The main threats to 
pluralism of media types include: lack of sufficient market resources to support the range 
of media, which causes a lack of/under-representation of/dominance of media types (p. 
75). Threats to media genres and functions include lack of/under-representation 
of/dominance of some functions, or genres are missing (p. 76). Threats to political 
pluralism dimension are unilateral influence of media by one political grouping, 
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insufficient representation of certain political/ideological groups or minorities with a 
political interest in society (p. 77). Threats to the cultural pluralism dimension include 
insufficient representation of certain cultural, religious, linguistic and ethnic groups in 
society, and threat to national cultural identity (p. 77). Lastly, threats to the geographical 
pluralism dimension are lack or underrepresentation of various national geographic areas 
and/or local communities (p. 79). 
 
To sum up, this study, which forms part of the European Commission’s three-step 
approach for advancing the debate on media pluralism within the EU, is a prototype for a 
European Media Pluralism Monitor – a risk-based, holistic, user-friendly and evolving 
monitoring tool that includes indicators of a legal, economic and socio-demographic 
nature. These indicators relate to various risk domains, including media ownership and/or 
control (the very subject of this chapter), media types and genres, political, cultural and 
demographic pluralism. The study makes it clear that while it urges the application of the 
same analytical framework in all Member States to ensure comparability of results 
obtained, it is not a call for harmonization of policies in this area. As in previous relevant 
EU documents and Treaties (see for example CEC, 1992; EU, 2007) it is repeated in this 
study that the sensitive matter of how to protect media pluralism is ultimately left to the 
discretion of Member States (p. viii). Paradoxically, even though the EU has substantially 
influenced market developments, principally on the basis of competition rules, where it 
enjoys direct powers, it nevertheless has no specific competence in cultural matters such 
as pluralism and broadcasting. By commissioning these studies though the EU has come 
to explicitly recognize the importance of socio-cultural policy objectives, citizen’s rights 
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and pluralism and diversity. This is a welcome development, although clearly the EU’s 
substantive policy output remains centered on economic and competition considerations. 
 
Methodologies of Measuring Media Market Concentration 
 
It should be spelled out from the outset that there have been developed no universal 
measuring methodologies. The reason is twofold. First, it is extremely difficult to develop 
a single unit of measurement capable of capturing the economic and socio-political power 
of media companies. Second, in media and communications policy there has always been 
a conflict between economic and cultural goals and it has been proved difficult to 
reconcile economic ideals (for example, promotion of fair and open competition, 
blockage of the formation of dominant positions) with cultural values (such as media 
pluralism and cultural diversity). This value conflict in media and communications policy 
- the need to cater simultaneously for economic and non-economic goals helps to explain 
differences between traditional media policies based on normative ideals and those recent 
policy reforms which seek sound empirical proof. As Just (2009) informs us, the most 
recent such approaches are the Diversity Index (DI) in the USA (2003), the public 
interest or plurality test in the UK (2003), the Integrated Communications Market (SIC) 
in Italy (2004), and a new approach to weighting the influence of various media by the 
German regulator KEK (2006). The task of developing a robust methodological approach 
which could result in a concentration measure equally catering for competition and 
pluralistic issues is further complicated by commercial and technological change and 
especially media convergence which has blurred the boundaries between different 
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communication sectors. Responding to this convergence trend companies have expanded 
their activities into various sectors, thereby making it even more difficult for regulators to 
develop an effective tool that could capture economic and political/cultural power.  
 
The purpose of assessing levels of concentration in the media industry is to establish 
whether market structure restricts pluralism and diversity. Economic-based measures that 
are used in industrial structure and manufacturing sector, such as the Concentration 
Ratios, the Lorenz Curve and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), are not appropriate 
for measuring concentration levels in the media industry. In the media, because of their 
nature and significant role in culture, society and politics measures examining the media 
firms' economic power alone seem to be inadequate. The special social significance 
attached to the media's role in disseminating information requires an investigation of 
whether a concentrated media market restricts the free flow of information. As Karstens 
(2008) argues, ‘measuring pluralism by economy-based criteria runs the risk of falling 
short of what is desirable from the perspective of political culture, art and science, 
minority opinions, and cultural identity’. And he continues ‘paying only lip service to 
these values and assuming that free competition will take care of them anyway may not 
do justice to Europe’s cultural tradition and, indeed, competitive advantage’.   
 
To overcome this limitation of economic-based measures a few media analysts have 
proposed a number of media concentration measures which take into account their 
importance to the public. The view that has emerged from the past debate on media 
concentration in Europe (initiated by the EU 1992 Green Paper) is that it is possible to 
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measure the 'influence' exerted by the media by applying audience-based criteria. This 
approach has now been abandoned both because it has been proved difficult to design an 
audience-based methodology on a Europe-wide scale that would accurately calculate 
shares across sectors and construct weightings for each sector based on their relative 
influence or marker power, and because of differences of opinions within the European 
Commission and between different European bodies (see Iosifidis, 1997; Doyle, 2002). 
 
Likewise in the UK, the May 1995 Green Paper on Media Ownership attempted to 
determine the thresholds of ownership in terms of the ‘total share of voice’ for markets 
beyond which acquisitions would have to be referred to the media regulator (UK, 1995). 
The Green Paper’s approach was largely derived from a submission by the British Media 
Industry Group (BMIG, 1994) which advocated using consumer usage of media 
(newspaper circulation, TV/radio ratings) to calculate the total share of voice of any 
proprietor. Where ownership of a media outlet was shared between firms of proprietors 
the share of voice would be allotted in proportion to the percentage of ownership. But in 
mid-December 1995 the UK government published its Broadcasting Bill which did not 
contain any such proposals. The then National Heritage Secretary conceded that there 
was little agreement on the share of voice concept.  
 
However the audience-share model has been used in Germany for over a decade now in 
order to determine concentration levels in the national television market – in 2008 a 
broadcaster could own unlimited number of TV services provided s/he did not achieve a 
dominant position in the cultural and political market (that is, more than 30 per cent 
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audience share). In the course of its review of the proposed merger between 
ProSiebenSAT.1 Media AG and Alex Springer Media AG, the German regulator 
responsible for ensuring media diversity (Commission on Media Concentration – KEK) 
developed a new weighting approach on diversity of opinions that considers potential 
influences of different media. According to Just (2009) this weighting approach has 
provoked criticism on manageability and validity grounds, alongside issues relating to 
KEK’s competence to intervene in broadcasting issues at a national level, given that 
Germany is a federal state but broadcasting issues are dealt with at a Laender (state) 
level.  
 
In contrast, in the UK the Communications Act 2003 introduced a new approach to 
determine media diversity, the so-called ‘public interest test’ or ‘plurality test’, which 
applies to major players who wish to increase their interests in other areas of media, by 
buying newspapers, radio or television assets. The test examines whether such a deal 
would damage the plurality of media voices and owners. Office of Communications 
(Ofcom), the new super-regulator makes an initial assessment and if concerns arise it 
passes the case to the Competition Commission or Office of Fair Trading for an in-depth 
examination. However, the only media merger that was scrutinized on public interest 
grounds concerned satellite operator BSkyB’s November 2006 acquisition of 17.9 per 
cent of the ITN shares. In January 2008 the acquisition was allowed as the Competition 




Another recent attempt to define the total media market share (including radio, TV, 
cinema, the press, advertising and the Internet, but excluding telecommunications) was 
the ‘sistema integrato delle comunicazioni’ (Integrated System of Communication – SIC) 
in Italy. With this schema Italy entered the line of countries seeking to depart from 
commonly pursued market definitions in media and communications and instead start 
considering the media market as a whole. SIC’s market definition is too broad, thus 
making it unlikely that a firm will have a dominant position under this schema. But as 
Just (2009) argues, this newly introduced communication policy, verifies the trend 
(noticeable in both sides of the Atlantic) towards reduced ownership regulation and 
promotion of competition in the digitally converged communications market.  
 
In the USA, media convergence required the FCC to rethink its media ownership regime. 
Since similar types of communications are available through multiple delivering 
platforms the FCC cannot no longer calculate media ownership simply by relying on the 
number of available outlets for any particular communications technology. On the 
contrary, it should integrate the various technologies into a single metric that allocates 
appropriate weight to each technology. However, creating such a metric has been proved 
difficult (Yoo, 2009). The Court of Appeals has struck down the FCC’s recent attempt to 
issue new media ownership rules, not least because of the lack of consistency in its 
methodology for determining the weight to allocate to the various media (Prometheus 
Radio Project v. FCC, 2004).        
              
Measuring Shares in the Political and Cultural Market: An Assessment 
 23 
 
Large companies' sales and turnover may be the best indicator of their economic power 
and reveal their ability to gain market advantages compared to the rest. In other words, 
very powerful firms can influence economic conduct, performance and pricing behaviors 
and have an impact on barriers to entry and limitation of output. Therefore, when the 
purpose is the traditional examination of market power then a high revenue company 
share may provide a useful guide. When it comes to the media however, the concern not 
only is over the impact of concentration on economic aspects but there is also the 
question of the social performance of the market (pluralism and diversity). Are measures 
tailored to assess economic concentration good enough to capture concentration levels in 
the political and cultural market, the so-called 'market-place for ideas'? 
 
A follow-up question can be put: there is certainly a broad consensus in democratic 
societies that pluralism and diversity are important, but is there a practical or legal way to 
officially define and measure the vigor of a market-place for ideas? It has been argued 
that it is possible to identify a sort of relevant 'market for ideas', which does not coincide 
with the economic definition of relevant market; and that de facto restrictions of 
pluralism and diversity are the results of an abuse of power in such market (abuse of 
political and cultural power). There are three problems associated with such approach. 
Firstly, there are substantial difficulties in defining a suitable notion of relevant market in 
the political and cultural sense. As the relevant product tends to extend across different 
media, the cultural/political notion of the relevant market may be significantly broader 
than the economic one. The problem is bound to be exacerbated as multimedia 
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conglomerates expand their activities further, and ownership of complex transnational 
media chains becomes widespread. To illustrate, how does one assess the effective 
combined share of, say, News International in the broader market for information, culture 
and political opinion, comprising newspapers, TV outlets and Internet portals in several 
countries? Secondly, the exact nature of the potential abuse is not clear and explicable 
and cannot be specified in the same way as abuses of economic market may be specified. 
What then counts as an abuse of power in the political/ cultural market? Beyond the 
general assumption that all media exercise some form of political and cultural influence 
on the public, there have emerged no satisfactory criteria so far for the definition of a 
broad political and cultural market in which spheres of influence by a single controller 
could be assessed. 
 
The most serious reservation concerning this approach though has to do with the 
selection of the criteria for measuring diversity in the market place for ideas. It has been 
put forth that while financial units are close to the traditional systems of concentration 
measurement which permit assessment of media market concentration, audience-based 
methods are coherent with the cultural/political standpoint and can be held to be most 
effective for the measurement of pluralism and influence in the market-place for ideas. 
Nevertheless, influence over the audience cannot be assessed by using audience-based 
criteria, whether that is readership, audience reach, viewing or listenership share, etc. 
Audience exposure to mass media is certainly not the same as influence over the 
audience. In the end, these end-user measures are nothing but refinements of measures of 
market power. They measure market power, although in a more sophisticated way. They 
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are a form of market share measurement, which is a classic economic measurement. 
Audience-based units are the equivalent of, say, measuring sales, that is, market share, 
which is a classic economic measure of market power. 
 
Economic Power and Diversity: A Symbiotic Relationship 
 
In any case, political/cultural diversity and economic power are closely linked. It might 
be worth at this point spelling out the arguments about the relationship between economic 
power and the range of material offered. There is a clear relationship between economic 
measures of media power and influence/pluralism because economic power determines 
the control over choices offered. In fact, in terms of the public interest and debates about 
regulation and concentration of media ownership, there are two wide-spread arguments. 
On the one hand, there is the argument saying that a highly concentrated market structure 
in the media sector is of concern not only for the possibility that it may lead to abuses of 
economic market power, but also for the potential effects on pluralism. A large media 
player who controls a substantial portion of at least one media sector (for example daily 
press, TV or the Internet) has the potential for forcing his/her views across a range of 
products (political/cultural bias), and thus for restricting the choice of products available 
to the public in political and cultural terms. In this sense, a competition policy decision 
aimed at curbing an abuse of economic market power (for example, excessive pricing or 




On the other hand, there is the argument saying that increased competition may lead to 
less pluralism in the market. Increasing the number of firms in an industry does not 
necessarily imply greater diversity in the quality and variety of products on offer - 
especially where price competition is weak. If firms compete on price, product 
differentiation provides a device for softening the intensity of competition: in a simplified 
world with only two companies, they will have an incentive to locate themselves as far as 
possible from each other on the product line (offer as diverse a product as possible in 
terms of product variety and quality). Proximity of location would mean that prices are 
gradually eroded as the companies compete for each other's business. However, if there is 
no explicit interaction in the firms' pricing decisions, the opposite result obtains: the firms 
will locate as close as possible to one another, as the 'market share effect' (the incentive to 
be where demand is, or to increase one's market share given the market structure) prevails 
over the 'strategic effect' (the interdependence of the two firms' pricing decisions). Thus 
the incentive to differentiate products is weaker when companies are able to operate in 
the near-absence of price competition. The tendency to converge on tried-and-tested 
formulae poses a potential danger to welfare in terms of the variety of products offered 
by the market. Hotelling (1929: 41), who originally discussed this effect, talked of 'an 
undue tendency for competitors to imitate each other'. Therefore, a more fragmented 
industry structure in the media sector may not necessarily deliver the socially desirable 
level of product differentiation because it may be more profitable for the companies to 




A further important question relates to the possibility that too much competition might 
display a bias in favor of certain types of products and neglect others. The particular 
bundle of commodities that are actually produced in the media market (the type of 
programmes/titles available) might be sub optimal from a social welfare point of view. 
When demand for products in a particular category is generally inelastic, the products 
which are being actually offered may end up positioning too close to each other (sub 
optimal product diversity); and those products for which the elasticity is comparatively 
lower may not be produced at all. The implication could be that some segments of tastes 
and preferences might systematically not be catered for, although there might be a large 
number of different media products (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). So, strictly from the point 
of view of pluralism, there might be no automatic advantage to be gained from a more 
diverse media structure. On the other hand, so the argument runs, a very concentrated 
industry structure might lead to great diversity, if the dominant firm(s) seeks to prevent 
entry in the market by filling all gaps in product space. 
 
‘Best’ Criterion: An Illusion? 
 
Having provided, to some extent, an argument that economic power affects the range of 
material offered, and having spelled out the arguments as to whether concentration or a 
fragmented industry can deliver best the desired diversity, we now turn to the question of 
which criterion is 'best' for measuring concentration levels for media pluralism purposes. 
The close relationship between economic power and pluralism/diversity indicates that 
criteria that are being used for the measurement of market power can also be used, at 
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least in principle, for the measurement of media influence and vice versa. Financial 
criteria, for instance, a long-established method for measuring market power, could also 
be adopted for measuring 'influence' (audience exposure to the mass media); and 
audience figures, supposed to be more efficient for measuring diversity in the market 
place for ideas, could also be a measure of economic power, especially as they are sold to 
advertisers.  
 
The most common two different sets of methods (audience and revenue -based) are said 
to correspond to two levels of measurement of concentration in the information market: 
the political/cultural or pluralism and the economic or concentration of resources. It has 
been put forth that revenue-based methods are close to the traditional systems of 
concentration measurement which permit assessment of the existence of a dominant 
position (concentration of resources), whereas audience-based methods are coherent with 
the cultural/political standpoint and can be held to be most effective for measurement of 
pluralism. However, due to the close relationship between economic power and 
pluralism, audience figures could also measure market power. In fact, audience-based 
measures are a form of market share measurement, which is a classic economic 
measurement. 'Audience' are the equivalent of measuring sales (that is, market share), 
which is a classic economic measure of power. Therefore, the distinction between 
economic measures and cultural/political measures is irrelevant. Both sets of media 
market measurement assess market power. In the absence of a direct way of establishing 
'impact', crude measures based on market power (criteria about market structure) are used 
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instead. And what the audience and revenue-based methods are doing is in fact that - they 
evaluate market power. 
 
I would suggest that policymakers should not be obliged to choose between economic-
based measures (measures of market power) and measures pluralism/diversity, but could 
instead incorporate them. In the absence of a direct measure of influence it is necessary to 
develop an approach combining the various sets of methods to establish impact. The 
propositions include a combined test involving advertising and/or subscription revenues 
and audience shares, the setting of a percentage of market share in terms of 
revenue/expenditure as a threshold for further examination of the position, and an 
approach combining more measures such as numerical criteria, revenue share, audience 
share and audience time spent consuming a medium. What all these suggestions have in 
common is that they attempt to mix different measures and develop an approach which is 
applicable to all information services with different characteristics. This is because 
establishing a method of measuring multimedia concentration for the purposes of 
ensuring pluralism and diversity on the basis of a single unit is impossible.  
 
Combining different types of measurement is more likely to provide a valid method. The 
use of a combination of measures is essential since no single measure captures both the 
quantity and the quality of consumption which will tend to determine the degree of 
influence exerted and the extent of access and of content diversity offered. In the final 
analysis, it is the duty of regulators to use the measurement approaches they deem 
necessary to build up a complete picture of the market and the actions required to ensure 
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the outcomes the regulation aims to achieve. But the more information about the market 
position of media firms a regulator has the less disputed his/her judgment will be. Just as 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer receives a wide range of information to decide whether 
inflationary pressures are sufficient to justify a rise in interest rates, so any media 
regulator will need a great deal of information extracted from a wide range of indicators 
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1 This does not mean that all vertical merger cases have been successful, for the AOL has now been split 
from Time Warner and in 2010 it announced its first earnings report. 
2 The objective of the study was to develop a monitoring tool for assessing the level of 
media pluralism in the EU Member States and identifying threats to such pluralism based 
on a set of indicators, covering pertinent legal, economic and socio-cultural 
considerations (p. vii), (see 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/media_taskforce/doc/pluralism/pfr_report.pdf, 
accessed 8 June 2008). 
